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Stimuli of the environment, like objects, systematically activate the actions they are
associated to. These activations occur extremely fast. Nevertheless, behavioral data
reveal that, in most cases, these activations are then automatically inhibited, around
100 ms after the occurrence of the stimulus. We thus tested whether this early inhibition
could be indexed by a central component of the N1 event-related brain potential (ERP).
To achieve that goal, we looked at whether this ERP component is larger in tasks that
could increase the inhibition and in trials where reaction times (RTs) happen to be long.
The illumination of a real space bar of a keyboard out of the dark was used as a stimulus.
To maximize the modulation of the inhibition, the task participants had to perform was
manipulated across blocks. A look-only task and a count task were used to increase
inhibition and an immediate press task was used to decrease it. ERPs of the two block-
conditions where presses had to be prevented and where the largest central N1s were
predicted were compared to those elicited in the press task, differentiating the ERPs
to the third of the trials where presses were the slowest from the ERPs to the third of
the trials with the fastest presses. Despite larger negativities due to lateralized readiness
potentials (LRPs) and despite greater attention likely in immediate press-trials, central
N1s were found to be minimal for the fastest presses, intermediate for the slowest
ones and maximal for the two no-press conditions. These results thus provide a strong
support for the idea that the central N1 indexes an early and short lasting automatic
inhibition of the actions systematically activated by objects. They also confirm that the
strength of this automatic inhibition spontaneously fluctuates across trials and tasks.
On the other hand, just before N1s, parietal P1s were found larger for fastest presses.
They might thus index the initial activation of these actions. Finally, consistent with the
idea that N300s index late inhibition processes, that occur preferentially when the task
requires them, these ERPs were quasi absent for fast presses trials and much larger in
the three other conditions.
Keywords: affordances, actions associated to stimuli, ERPs, N1, LRP, P1, early activation, automatic inhibition
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HIGHLIGHTS
– Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by a real object
– Smaller parietal P1s and larger central N1s for slowest than for fastest motor
responses
– Even larger central N1s for tasks without such responses
– Central N1s may index early inhibition of stimulus-activated actions
– Lateralized readiness potential (LRP) could index a suppression of prolonged motor
inhibition
– N300s could index late inhibition of stimulus-activated actions
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, affordances is a word often used to designate the
possible actions that are systematically and pre-consciously
primed by objects (Tucker and Ellis, 1998)1. Such actions
are now central to theories of embodied cognition (for a
review, see Matheson et al., 2015). Systematically activated
‘‘motor representations’’ of objects are considered integral to the
identification of an object (Clark, 1999; Wilson, 2002). These
systematic activations were shown by Tucker and Ellis (1998),
as well as others (e.g., Borghi and Riggio, 2008; Phillips and
Ward, 2002), in experiments in which subjects viewed pictures
of graspable objects whose handle was oriented either to the
left or to the right. Responses were faster with the left hand
for pictures of objects with handles oriented to the left whereas
right-hand responses were faster when the handle of the objects
was oriented to the right. Although these compatibility effects
seem to exist even when attention is not focused on affordances
(Symes et al., 2006), their sizes are increased by attending to the
action-related features of the object (Tipper, 2010). For instance,
focusing on a cup’s handle elicited larger compatibility effects
than focusing on unrelated features, such as the color of the
object (Tipper et al., 2006).
Results of imaging studies corroborated the idea that
objects systematically activate sensory-motor brain regions
and thus motor representations. A PET study of object’s
perception showed activations in the inferior parietal lobule,
the supplementary motor area, the dorsal and ventral precentral
gyri and the cerebellum in comparison to viewing non-objects
(Grèzes and Decety, 2002). Studies using manipulable objects
have shown that the observation of tools, even without having
to use them, trigger strong left dorsal premotor cortex activation
(Grafton et al., 1997). The ventral premotor cortex and the
left posterior parietal cortex were also activated by viewing and
naming pictures of tools compared to control items in a study
by Chao andMartin (2000). Other works have provided evidence
for a functional separation of the dorsal pathway (Rizzolatti et al.,
1998). It has been divided into a dorso-dorsal subpathway that
controls actions and a ventro-dorsal pathway that codes the
representations of actions (Rizzolatti andMatelli, 2003; Buxbaum
and Kalénine, 2010; Binkofski and Buxbaum, 2013). The former
runs from visual areas (V6) and the superior parietal lobe to
1Although Gibson (1977) first introduced the term to refer to the physical
properties of the environment that are associated with actions, such as the grasping
afforded by a stick or the warming afforded by a fire.
the dorsal premotor cortex. The latter projects from the medial
superior temporal area into the inferior parietal lobe.
However, most of the times, performing the actions that are
systematically primed by the occurrence of stimuli is contextually
inappropriate. This is true not only for trying to grab an object
whose picture appears on a screen but also, in everyday life, for
acting in a way that would not be consistent with our goals.
Given that all objects of our environment seem to prime the
actions they are associated to, inhibition of all those unwanted
actions must be a quasi-ceaseless mechanism of wide importance
(Miller, 2000; Ridderinkhof, 2002a,b; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004;
Sumner et al., 2007). This means that performing actions at
the right time might then depend on a temporary suppression
of the ceaseless inhibition. Many facts are consistent with the
existence of this ceaseless inhibition. For instance, when subjects
have to press some buttons on a board while ignoring others, the
motor representations associated with the to-be-ignored buttons
are inhibited (e.g., Tipper et al., 1992). Or, when certain lesions
disrupt the inhibition of affordances, in anarchic limb behaviors
for example, the patient would act upon the affordance to grasp a
cup with the hand congruent with handle orientation, rather than
following the instruction to always grasp with the hand closest
to the cup (Riddoch et al., 1998). Similarly, frontal lesions result
in ‘‘utilization behaviors,’’ which are defined as the difficulty in
resisting the use of an object within reach (e.g., Archibald et al.,
2001). When discovering the pen of the doctor on his/her desk,
these patients will grab it and use it.
The results obtained in yet another tradition of research
objectivize the existence of such a systematic inhibition of
actions. These results show that selective motor inhibition occurs
automatically even without conscious perception and voluntary
effort (Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003; Sumner et al., 2007;
Atas and Cleeremans, 2015). They were obtained by using brief
presentations of elementary visual objects (primes), which were
immediately masked by another visual stimulus before a target
appears. The primes were either compatible or incompatible with
the target. In this type of design, compatible primes delayed
reaction times (RTs) to targets. Recent works show that these
RT increases reveal an automatic motor inhibition rather than
a competition with an incorrect ‘‘opposite-to-prime’’ response
(Vainio et al., 2011; Ocampo and Finkbeiner, 2013; Atas and
Cleeremans, 2015).
Electrophysiological studies of object affordances have
shed light on the mechanisms underlying the inhibition of
affordances. The disappearance of a graspable object was found
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to enhance mu-rhythm synchronization (Schuck et al., 2010)
while its viewing had induced a mu-rhythm desynchronization.
In a quite different domain, a study by Debruille et al. (2012)
investigated the inhibition of the social affordances that are
automatically elicited by faces, such as making eye contact,
smiling, saying hello and starting a conversation. For that
purpose, they used the face of a confederate with whom making
eye contacts was appropriate and the face of a dummy for
whom this automatically activated affordance had to be inhibited.
A block design was used in order to increase the focus on
activations that occur systematically and would thus have to
be automatically inhibited when inappropriate. Event-related
brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by the two face stimuli were then
compared. Those of the dummy included larger central N300s
than those of the face of the confederate. This was interpreted
as indexing the greater amount of affordance inhibition required
for the dummy. Interestingly, these ERPs had the same latency
and the same central scalp distribution as the NoGo N2 potential
(Falkenstein et al., 1999; Ocklenburg et al., 2011), an ERP that is
precisely elicited in conditions where (simple) actions associated
to simple stimuli have to be prevented and which has thus been
associated to their inhibition (Jodo and Kayama, 1992; Bruin and
Wijers, 2002; Roche et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, these N300- and No-Go-N2-ERPs onset around
200 ms post-stimulus onset. They thus start too late to
index mechanisms that could prevent the actions systematically
activated by the stimulus. Indeed, these systematic activations
occur extremely early. For instance, when participants are
observing graspable objects, the increase in muscle excitability
starts as early as 120 ms after the onset of the presentation
(Franca et al., 2012). Similar delays were obtained in a study
where participants learned to associate the contraction of the
tibialis anterior muscle of each ankle in responses to an auditory
cue (Schneider et al., 2004) or when measuring facial action
(i.e., spontaneous mimicry) in response to the presentation of
happy and neutral faces (Korb et al., 2010). Actions associated
to a stimulus thus appear to be activated in the brain in as
little as 100 ms after the onset of the stimulus. Indeed, at
least two dozen ms have to be subtracted from the 120 ms
delays mentioned above in order to take into account the time
for the brain output to reach and excite the muscles recorded
and, for the first two studies, for the movement to attain a
measurable size. Brain mechanisms that prevent affordance from
being acted upon thus have to start as early as 100 ms. Without
such mechanisms, we could start acting each time a stimulus
associated to an action occurs in our environment. This can
also be deduced from the duration of the presentation of the
primes in the studies that were mentioned above in order to
show that selective motor inhibition occurs automatically even
without conscious perception and voluntary effort (Eimer and
Schlaghecken, 2003; Sumner et al., 2007; Vainio et al., 2011;
Ocampo and Finkbeiner, 2013; Atas and Cleeremans, 2015). The
elementary visual objects used as primes were presented for only
30–70 ms before being masked.
The high temporal resolution of the ERP technique makes
it an ideal tool for exploring such a fast inhibition mechanism.
The N1 ERP elicited by visual stimuli onsets at a latency
compatible with the early inhibition necessary to prevent
immediate action upon fast affordance activation. Although its
posterior, that is, occipital components, are known to index
processing of the physical features of the visual stimuli, the
functional significance of its central components is not well
known. Most interestingly, these more anterior components
have been previously related to the processing of affordances
in two studies. The first, that of Proverbio et al. (2007),
reports that manipulable objects elicited larger central N1s than
animal entities, suggesting that anterior motor regions might
be involved in action-centered representations of tools. The
second is that of Debruille et al. (2012) whose N300 results
have been mentioned above. In this study, ERPs in the
N1 time windows were more negative for the dummy, with
whom social affordance were inappropriate, than for the real
person. Also noteworthy, the N1 has been shown to be of
larger amplitude for stop- than for go-signals (Kenemans,
2015; Senderecka, 2016; Raud and Huster, 2017) and for
successful than for unsuccessful stop-signal conditions (e.g.,
Bekker et al., 2005; Wild-Wall et al., 2008; Pires et al.,
2014). It has thus been proposed as an index of a directed
(or learned) action-inhibition.
Therefore, the first goal of the present study was to test
whether the central N1 could index the early and automatic
inhibition that objects would spontaneously trigger just after they
activate the actions they are associated to. This early automatic
inhibition was hypothesized to be of very short duration, that is
to last only until the occurrence of the second negativity, that is,
the N300 or the No-Go N2, which seems to index a later, more
context-dependent, inhibition.
The second goal of the current study was to search for
a candidate ERP index of the fast and systematic activation
of actions (or affordances) that occurs before the automatic
inhibition. We thus explored whether the ERP that precedes it,
that is, the P1, could index it. This idea was based on the parieto-
central P1s that were related to initial action activation by Kiefer
et al. (2011). Here, we assumed that greater activations would
lead to faster actions. We thus hypothesized larger parietal P1s
for trials with short than for those with long RTs, as the threshold
for real action would be reached faster.
The third goal was to examine the N300 elicited by the display
of an object and see whether its amplitude would vary as an
index of the late and context-dependent inhibition of the actions
automatically activated by stimuli, as seemed to be the case for
the face of the dummy in Debruille et al. (2012). Accordingly,
we looked at whether this amplitude would be large in the tasks
where subjects have to prevent performing the action than in
tasks where they have to perform it.
To achieve these three goals, we designed a study with one
simple and highly familiar object: the spacebar of a computer
keyboard. It was assumed that, for anyone who grew up in the
age of computers, this stimulus systematically activates the action
of pressing it, just as a coffee cup handle affords grasping, an
idea already used in other recent studies (e.g., Horváth, 2013).
The present study was conducted in a completely dark room and
the spacebar of a keyboard placed in front of the subject was
illuminated sporadically, thus appearing out of darkness. The
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method used to manipulate the automatic inhibition was based
on the fact that some automatic mechanisms (e.g., those of the
knee reflex) can be influenced and the action, prevented, reduced
or, on the contrary, amplified. A block design was used to
maximize this modulation. The space bar was the only stimulus
used and participants had to process it in exactly the same way
throughout each block in order to reinforce their strategy. Two
tasks were used to maximize the inhibition of presses, a look
only task and a count the number of appearances task. A task
where participant had to immediately press the space bar upon
its appearance was used to decrease automatic inhibition. Larger
central N1s were thus predicted in the two former tasks than in
this latter one.
Given that participants’ attention spontaneously fluctuates
across the trials of an experiment, it was assumed that both the
strength of the systematic activation and the strength of the early
automatic inhibition would also fluctuate across trials. In the
immediate press task, these fluctuations should lead to faster
presses when activation is strong and inhibition weak and to
slower presses when activation is weak and inhibition strong
(somewhat like in Atas and Cleeremans, 2015). The ERPs elicited
by the illumination of the space bar were thus averaged separately
according to whether the press was slow or fast. Larger central
N1s were predicted for the former than for the latter.
Importantly, two very well-known effects should drive
N1 amplitudes in the direction opposite to these predictions.
Firstly, the attention effect, as, relative to the look-only and
the count task, the immediate press task stimulates vigilance as
participants have to press as fast as possible. It should thus be
associated to greater attention and thus to larger N1s, an ERP
effect known to be maximal at occipital electrode sites (Luck
et al., 1993; Hillyard et al., 1995; Johannes et al., 1995; Hillyard
and Anllo-Vento, 1998). Secondly, the lateralized readiness
potentials (LRPs) elicited by press trials. They will be responsible
for more negative ERPs at central sites over the hemisphere
contralateral to the pressing-hand just before the pressing (Coles
et al., 1988; Miller and Hackley, 1992). This could thus be
mistaken for larger central N1s as RTs in simple tasks where no
choice has to be made are known to be roughly between 200 and
300ms (Niemi andNäätänen, 1981). The LRPs that precede them
will thus be within the N1 time window. In these conditions,
observing larger central N1s for the two tasks where the pressing
had to be prevented would thus be all the more demonstrative for
the inhibition hypothesis.
On the other hand, in order to look for an index of the
prior activation, we also compared ERPs of the four conditions
(i.e., fast-presses, slow-presses, count and look only) in the time
window preceding these N1s. Finally, N300s were explored to see
if their amplitudes would also beminimal when subjects act upon
the activated affordance, that is, in the press task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Nine females and 11 males with a mean age of 24 (range
18–30) were recruited as participants. They all learned about
the experiment through classified ad websites. Right-handed,
they had at least some university education and had normal- or
glasses-corrected to normal vision. None reported any personal
or family history of severe neurological or psychiatric disorder.
Participants were excluded if they consumed more than twelve
drinks of alcoholic beverages per week or if they used recreational
drugs, except if they used marijuana less than once per week.
They read and signed an informed consent form approved
by the Douglas Institute Research and Ethics Board and were
compensated for their time $15 per hour.
Procedure
Subjects performed the tasks seated in front of a computer
in a completely dark room. The screen and the keyboard of
the computer were concealed with cardboard, such that when
the screen of the computer turned from black to white, its
emanated light, which lasted 500 ms, was directed onto the
spacebar so that only this object (and the cardboard) was visible.
Inter-stimulus intervals varied randomly between 1.4 and 2.3 s.
During these intervals, the screen of the monitor was black
and subjects could not see the spacebar or any other object,
given the total darkness of the room. All 20 subjects completed
an experiment that consisted of three block-tasks, each one
including 100 occurrences of the space bar. They were instructed
to rest their right index finger just in front of the spacebar so
as to be ready to press it without obscuring its illumination. In
the ‘‘Press’’ task, subjects pressed the spacebar as fast as possible
as soon as it appeared. In the ‘‘Count’’ task, they gazed at the
spacebar and counted the number of times it appeared, giving a
final report of their count at the end of the block. In the ‘‘Look
only’’ task, subjects looked at the spacebar as it appeared and
disappeared and were instructed to never direct their gaze away
from it. The order of these three block-tasks was counterbalanced
across subjects.
Data Acquisition
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded with tin
electrodes mounted in an elastic cap (Electrocap International,
Eaton, OH, USA) at 28 of the sites of the extended International
10–20 system (Electrode Position Nomenclature Committee,
1991). The reference electrode was placed on the right earlobe.
The active electrode sites were grouped in a sagittal subset,
which included Fz, FCz, Cz and Pz; a parasagittal subset, which
comprised FP1/2, F3/4, FC3/4, C3/4, CP3/4, P3/4, and O1/2; and
a lateral subset, which consisted of F7/8, FT7/8, T3/4, TP7/8 and
T5/6. The EEG was amplified 20,000 times by Contact Precision
amplifiers. The half amplitudes cut-offs of their high- and
low-pass filters were set at 0.1 and 100 Hz, respectively, with an
additional electronic notch filter to remove 60Hz contamination.
Signals were digitized on-line at a 256 Hz sampling rate and
stored for subsequent averaging using the I-wave (version
5.24) software package. Behavioral data, consisting of response
times for the press-task, were recorded using the E-prime
(version 2.0) software.
Data Processing
EEG epochs of the 100 trials of each block-task were examined.
Trials of the press-task in which response time exceeded 500 ms
or in which there was no response were excluded, leading to an
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average of 5.6 trials being excluded. Trials contaminated by eye
movements, excessive myogram, amplifier saturations or analog
to digital clipping were removed off-line when analog to digital
clipping exceeded a 100 ms duration or when the absolute value
of the amplitude exceeded 100µV. For the press task, the third of
the trials in which subjects responded the fastest were separated
from the third of the trials in which subjects responded the
slowest. This was done so as to use this fast-press condition as
the control one. Indeed, as the early inhibition appears to be
automatic, it was assumed to be always present, but minimal in
the case of the fast-press trials. ERPs to stimuli were computed in
each subject in the ‘‘Count’’ ‘‘Look Only’’ ‘‘Fast Press’’ and ‘‘Slow
Press’’ conditions by averaging the EEG epochs of these trials in
each task using a −200–0 ms baseline and looking up to 600 ms
post-stimulus onset.
Measures and Analyses
Visual inspection of event-related potentials (ERPs) revealed
differences between conditions in the P1, N1 and N300 time
windows. To assess the statistical significance of these differences,
mean ERP voltages were first measured in time windows
centered on their peaks, that is, in the 80–120, the 120–200 and
the 300–500 ms time window, respectively. These measures
were entered in three repeated-measures analysis of variances
(ANOVAs) using a multivariate approach. The ANOVAs for
the sagittal subset of electrodes included two within-subject
factors: (a) condition, which had four levels: ‘‘Fast Press’’
vs. ‘‘Slow Press’’ vs. ‘‘Count’’ vs. ‘‘Look Only’’); and (b)
electrode site. In the ANOVAs dedicated to the parasagittal
and lateral subset of electrodes, a hemiscalp (left vs. right)
factor was added. Other ANOVAs were then conducted on
the region of interest (e.g., C3, Cz and C4 for the central
N1s). To test the hypothesis of a difference between fast and
slow presses, an additional ANOVA was conducted comparing
only the fast-press and the slow-press conditions. A similar
ANOVA was also conducted to determine if there was any
difference between ‘‘Count’’ and ‘‘Look Only’’ conditions. The
Greenhouse and Geisser (1959) correction for lack of sphericity
was used to correct degrees of freedom for the factors that
had more than two levels (i. e., condition and electrode).
In this case, original degrees of freedom are reported with
corrected p-values.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
Average response times in the press condition were 206 ms
(SD = 35.9) for the 3rd of the trials which induced the fastest
responses and 291 ms (SD = 34.5) for the 3rd of the trials
which induced the slowest ones. In the ‘‘Count’’ task, subjects
reported an average of 100.5 illuminations (SD = 2.6) out of the
100 illuminations of the space bar.
FIGURE 1 | Unsmoothed grand average (n = 20) of the event-related brain potentials (ERPs) elicited by the occurrence of the space bar of a keyboard out of the
dark. Negative polarity is plotted upward. Green lines are for the fastest reaction-times (RTs) trials of the block-task where the subjects had to press the space bar as
fast as possible. Red lines are for the slowest RTs trials of that task. Blue lines are for the block-task where participants had to count mentally the number of
appearances of that space bar. Black lines are for the block-task where they just had to look at the space bar. The order of these three tasks was counterbalanced
across subjects. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.001.
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Electrophysiological Data
Visual Inspection
Given that block design experiments are now much less
frequently used, ERPs will first be described qualitatively in
order to pinpoint their particular characteristics. Figure 1, where
negative polarity is plotted upward, shows the unsmoothed grand
average ERPs of the four conditions. It first displays an early
difference (e.g., at Pz and P4) where parietal P1s seem larger for
fast presses (green lines) than for other conditions. Then, in the
following time window, at sagittal and right para-sagittal sites,
the first sizeable negative deflections, the N1s, appear smaller for
these fast presses, intermediate for slow presses (red lines) and
maximal for the count- (blue lines) and the look-only- (black
lines) block-condition. Importantly, these smallest N1s for fast
presses appear unlikely to be due to larger P1s, as the latter
were maximal at parietal sites. At more anterior sites (e.g., C4,
FC4 and FCz), no larger P1s can be seen whereas N1s for fast
presses clearly appear smaller than N1s for other conditions.
Noteworthy, the bilaterally large N1 deflections for no press
trials can be observed not only over central-, but also over
frontal-sites (Fz, F3, F4, F7 and F8) as depicted by Figures 1,
2. In the fast press trials, negativities in the time window of
the N1 deflections appear smaller over central and frontal sites,
except at the left central ones where a LRP is likely to make the
ERPs more negative.
This contrasts with what can be observed at occipital sites,
where N1s look larger for both press-trials than for the two other
conditions, especially at O1. These N1s are followed by a P2,
which can be best individualized at Fz and FCz, around 200 ms.
Later, peaking around 300 ms, is a large positive wave maximal at
Pz, which clearly appears to be a P3b occurring before the second
negative deflection, as can be seen in simple tasks where only one
stimulus occurs repeatedly and where no choice has to be made
(Donchin et al., 1978). This late posterior positivity appeared
much larger for fast presses than for the three other conditions,
in line with the well-known sensitivity of this potential to task
relevance and attention. These P3bs precede sizable negative
waves (second negativities) maximal around 400 ms at Fz, which
seemed almost abolished for fast-presses and large for all other
conditions. These latter differences appeared maximal at FCz, Cz
and were smaller at Pz.
Given that the larger P3b for fastest presses could occur earlier
in some participants than in others, they could overlap N1s.
There was thus a possibility for theN1s amplitude to appear small
for fast presses not because of weaker N1 processes. To eliminate
this possibility, we subtracted the ERPs of the fast presses from
the ERPs to every other condition. Figure 2 illustrates the results
of these subtractions. There, the effect on the N1s corresponds to
an early deflection that clearly differs from the one corresponding
to the large effect on latter ERPs. Moreover, at some electrode
sites (i.e., FCz, C4, CP4 and P4) these two deflections are
separated by a return to the baseline.
Analyses
Parietal P1 TimeWindow (80–120 ms)
The ANOVA conducted with the mean ERP voltages at the
80–120 ms time window for the sagittal subset of electrodes
did not reveal any main effect of condition nor any significant
interaction of this factor with electrode. Given the a priori
hypothesis we had for the parietal site, a one-way ANOVA was
attempted at Pz. There, P1s only tended to be larger for fast
press trials than for the three other conditions at Pz (F(3,57) = 2.9,
p = 0.063). Similarly, the ANOVA conducted for the parasagittal
subset did not reveal any main effect of condition nor any
significant interaction of this factor with electrode or hemiscalp.
Given the a priori hypothesis and the visual inspection, a
FIGURE 2 | Results of the unsmoothed subtractions of the grand averages of the ERPs elicited by the occurrence of the space bar when RTs were the fastest from
the ERPs when RTs were the slowest (red lines), from the ERPs in the count block-task (blue lines) and from the ERPs of the look-only block-task (black lines). These
subtractions were performed to distinguish the N1-effect from the effect on late ERPs.
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one-way ANOVA was conducted at P4. It was found that P1s
were only marginally larger for fast press trials than for the
three other conditions (F(3,57) = 3.0, p = 0.044). The ANOVA
performed for the lateral subset did not reveal any statistically
significant difference.
N1 TimeWindows (120–200 ms)
The ANOVAs revealed a main effect of condition at the sagittal
(F(3,57) = 6.8, p = 0.0005), parasagittal (F(3,57) = 6.6, p = 0.0007)
and lateral (F(3,57) = 7.0, p = 0.0004) subsets of electrodes.
Significant interactions between condition and electrode were
observed only for the parasagittal subset (F(18,342) = 2.9, p = 0.03)
where differences appeared somewhat reversed at occipital sites
(O1/2). Analyses run at the sites of interest for the central N1
(FC3/4, C3/4 and CP3/4) revealed similar results for the main
effect of condition (F(3,57) = 5.3, p = 0.003), which interacted
with hemiscalp (F(3,57) = 3.2, p = 0.045) in accordance with the
much smaller differences between conditions seen over the left-
than over the right-hemiscalp in Figure 1. The post hoc analyses
run for each hemiscalp at these electrode sites to find the source
of this condition × hemiscalp interaction revealed a significant
effect of condition over the right hemiscalp (F(3,57) = 7.5,
p = 0.00025) and a barely significant one over the left hemiscalp
(F(3,57) = 2.9, p = 0.04). Further analyses showed larger central
N1s at these sites (FC4, C4 and CP4) for slow- than for fast-press-
trials (F(1,19) = 8.5, p = 0.009), larger central N1s for look-only
N1s than for the fast-press condition (F(1,19) = 11.4, p = 0.003)
and for count than for fast-presses (F(1,19) = 8.2, p = 0.01).
Conversely, ANOVAs including just the ‘‘Count’’ and ‘‘Look
Only’’ conditions revealed no significant effect of condition and
thus, no significant difference in N1 amplitude between these two
tasks, at any subsets.
Another post hoc ANOVA was conducted in the same
120–200 ms time window at occipital electrodes (O1/2) to test
the reversal and thus to see whether posterior N1s were larger for
the task requiring more attention, that is, for the press task. This
was somewhat the case (F(3,57) = 3.21, p = 0.05). This modestly
significant effect was larger over the left than over the right
hemiscalp (F(3,57) = 3.22, p = 0.046).
N300 TimeWindows (300–500 ms)
The ANOVAs revealed significantly larger N300s at the sagittal
(F(3,57) = 16.9, p < 0.00001), parasagittal (F(3,57) = 14.8,
p < 0.00001) and lateral (F(3,57) = 10.8, p = 0.00001) subset
of electrodes for the three conditions other than that of the
fast presses. At the parasagittal subset of electrodes, this effect
tended to interact with electrode F(18,342) = 2.9, p = 0.06 and with
electrode and hemiscalp F(18,342) = 2.4, p = 0.022. Nevertheless,
no post hoc on specific electrode was run as the difference was
so likely to be due to both greater N300s for no-press trials
at central electrodes and larger P300bs (or LPP or P3b, see
Figure 1) maximal at Pz for fastest-presses. Both N300 and P300b
effects were fully expectable, given the literature and were, most
probably, found here, as illustrated by Figures 1, 2, which shows
not only large differences at central and fronto-central electrodes,
where N300 are usually maximal, but also at Pz, where the peak
of the P300b is maximal.
DISCUSSION
To test whether the amplitude of the central N1 ERP indexes
the strength of the early and automatic inhibition of the actions
systematically activated by real objects, we used a novel paradigm
in which the space bar of a computer keyboard was illuminated
in order to appear out of the dark and to activate the action
of pressing it. A block task-design was used to maximize the
modulation of automatic inhibition. In each block, participants
had to process the only stimulus, the space bar, in exactly the
same way to re-enforce the processing strategy. Two of the three
blocks were aimed at increasing inhibition. There, the task of
subjects was to prevent themselves from pressing the space bar.
In one of these two blocks, they had to count the number of
times it appeared. In the other, they just had to look at it. The
third block was used to decrease the automatic inhibition of
the action. There, the task was to press the space bar as fast as
possible. On the other hand, just as attention, the strength of
activations and inhibitions was assumed to fluctuate from trial
to trial within the same block and presses were assumed to be
performed faster when their activations were stronger and their
inhibitions weaker. The third of the trials where participants
pressed it the fastest were thus isolated from the third of the
trials where they pressed it the slower in order to use them as the
control condition and to see if central N1 amplitudes would be
minimal for them, intermediate for slowest presses and maximal
in the count-block and the look-only block.
The space bar was pressed on average about 250 ms after the
onset of its illumination. Motor responses were thus output by
the brain in 200 ms or less and thus before the onset of the
N300 (Figure 1). In accordance with the idea that the central
N1 indexes an early automatic inhibition, the amplitudes of this
ERP were found to be the largest for the two tasks where subjects
had to prevent themselves from pressing the space bar. They
were intermediate for the slow-press trials and smallest for the
fast-press trials.
These effects appear remarkable because they were observed
despite two factors moving ERPs in the direction opposite to
the predictions. Firstly, pressing the space bar as fast as possible
induced greater attention relative to the two other tasks and thus
larger N1s, particularly at occipital scalp sites (Luck et al., 1990,
1993; Hillyard et al., 1995; Johannes et al., 1995; Hillyard and
Anllo-Vento, 1998), in accordance with the results observed in
the present work at O1/2. Secondly, the space bar pressing done
with the right hand induced LRPs and thus larger negativities
at the left central scalp sites (C3) just before the action and
thus during the N1 time window (Coles et al., 1988; Miller and
Hackley, 1992). This is illustrated by Figure 1, where there was
virtually no difference across the four conditions at this electrode
site, and barely any at FC3, in the N1 deflections. At these sites,
LRPs have compensated weaker N1 processes. On the contrary,
at right central sites, no or smaller LRPs increased the negativity
of ERPs of the N1 time window for fast press trials. Most likely,
this is why much smaller N1 deflections can be observed in this
condition, in accordance with the early inhibition hypothesis.
The results thus strongly support the idea that the central
N1s evoked by stimuli that are associated to actions indexes an
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early and automatic inhibition of the actions these stimuli just
activated. The strength of this inhibition would fluctuate from
trial to trial, allowing fast-presses when weaker, slower presses
when stronger and preventing presses when maximum, as in
the count- and the look-only condition. On the other hand,
the larger central N1s for the look-only- and for the count-task
support the idea that the early and automatic inhibition is
somewhat dependent on the task instructions and is boosted
when subjects have to prevent the action. This task sensitivity
would be consistent with findings showing that even automatic
processes can be modulated to some extent by the task (e.g.,
Danion, 2013), just as the knee reflex can be prevented, reduced,
or, on the contrary, amplified.
However, results can be viewed from a wider perspective. As
mentioned in the introduction, it is likely that, whenever the
system detects that an action can be done, an inhibition has to
prevent it until it is time to perform this action. This was probably
the case as soon as our participants arrived in the testing room
and saw the space bar they could press. Seeing this stimulus
instantly activated the press action. A continuous inhibition of
the pressing action had to take place until the experiment started
and until the space bar was illuminated during the press-block.
This illumination had to temporarily dampen this continuous
inhibition so that the press action could be performed. On the
contrary, in no-press trials, this continuous inhibition had to
be reinforced each time the stimulus occurs, as this occurrence
systematically (re)activates the action and, importantly, does so
for both hands. It is this reinforcement that could be responsible
for the bilaterally large N1 deflections observed for no press trials
not only over central-, but also over frontal-sites (Fz, F3, F4,
F7 and F8) as depicted by Figures 1, 2. Inappropriate weaker
reinforcements would account for the slightly more negative
ERPs observed for slow- than for fast-presses over F3, Fz,
F4 and F8.
In contrast, during fast press trials, no such reinforcement
would have occurred, hence the smaller negativities in the
time window of the N1 deflections observed over central and
frontal sites, except at the left central ones (C3) where an LRP
would make the ERPs more negative. This LRP could index the
temporary dampening of the continuous inhibition so that the
press action can be performed, as mentioned above. In other
terms, the LRP could index yet another inhibition mechanism.
As it would be made exclusively for the index of the right hand,
the finger with which participants had to respond, it would
account for the (left) distribution of the LRP over the scalp. This
distribution is much more restricted than that of the central N1,
the index of the reinforcement of the inhibition. The LRP would
prevent ERPs of the fast-presses to be less negative than those of
the other conditions only at left central sites (C3).
The second negative deflections, the N300s, appeared after
the P3b, which can be the case in designs where only one
stimulus is presented repeatedly and where no choice as to be
made by participants (Donchin et al., 1978). N300s appeared in
this study as large negative going deflections peaking around
400 ms post onset at central scalp sites. The lateness of their
peak (i.e., 400 ms) could be due to the unusual presentations
used here, that is, that of a stimulus suddenly occurring out of
the dark, to which the subject was thus adapted during most
of the experiment. These N300s were largest in the condition-
blocks where presses had to be prevented, that is, for the look-
and the count-task. This appears consistent with the idea that
the N300 would, like the Nogo N2, indexes a late inhibition of
actions, which is not automatic but occurs in tasks and contexts
that require it and can relay the early inhibition indexed by the
central N1. The N300 duration, which appears here to be longer
than that of the N300s obtained for a unique stimulus repeated
in an entire block of trials (Debruille et al., 2012), could be due to
the prolonged duration of the presentations of the space bar. The
brain continued to be activated by the presentation of a real 3D
object for 500 ms, maintaining the need for inhibition.
Although a real object was used as a stimulus here, it was
appearing in very special conditions. Only the space bar was
visible, not the rest of the keyboard. Moreover, the room was
in complete darkness most of the times. Finally, the task of
the subject was not to write a text and to press the space bar
between two words, as is normally done with a space bar. It
was to press it suddenly, completely outside of the context of
its normal use. In such conditions, the appearance of the object
may thus elicit an N300 even when the task instruction specifies
to act upon the affordance and press the space bar as fast as
possible. This could account for the remaining N300 deflections
that can be seen in the ERPs of the press task and would be
compatible with the idea that the N300 would, like the NoGo N2,
indexes a late inhibition of actions, which is not automatic but
occurs in tasks and contexts that require it. Note that, together
with the attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992) and/or some
motor refractory period, these remaining N300s activities might
account for the absence of a second press in the case of fast-press
trials. In effect, given that the space bar remained visible for
500 ms, it continued to activate the action of pressing it, which
could have triggered a second press.
The large N1 and N300 differences found between fast- and
slow-press trials reveal how much ERPs can differ from one trial
to the next for the same stimulus presented in the same task.
The inhibitory processes they index would thus spontaneously
fluctuate in strength along time, just like vigilance. Another
thing that may be inferred from the data is that even the
late inhibition, that is, the one indexed by the N300s, would
not last for a very long time. This can be deducted from the
presence of the large N300s in the look-only- and in the count-
condition, which show that N300s occurred at many of the
presentations of the space bar along the trials of these blocks. If
the N300 inhibition had a long duration, nomore N300 processes
would have been needed after a few trials in these blocks and
no large N300s would have been observed on the averages. The
N1- and N300-inhibitions could provide the system with just
enough time to fully process the meaning of the occurrence of
the stimulus according to its context before acting. This meaning
process is known to be indexed by the N400 ERP (for reviews,
see Debruille, 2007; Kutas and Federmeier, 2011; and Debruille
et al., 2008; Shang and Debruille, 2013), which peaks around
450 ms for objects that are presented normally, that is, not in
a complete darkness (see for instance Ganis and Kutas, 2003;
Mudrik et al., 2009).
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On the other hand, parietal P1s were marginally larger
for fastest presses than for other condition-blocks. This is
reminiscent of the larger centro-parietal P1 found by Kiefer
et al. (2011). It thus seems possible to hypothesize that these
centro-parietal P1s index the beginning of the activations of
representations of the actions associated to stimuli. Further
studies using stimuli activating actions less elementary than
just pressing a computer key might be necessary to have larger
P1 differences whose analysis will lead to clear-cut results. Note
that the possibility that these larger P1s could, by overlap across
participants, be responsible for the smaller central N1s can be
eliminated by examining the sites at which no larger P1s can be
seen for fast-presses and where N1s are still smaller (e.g., at FCz
and FC4).
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that
components of the central N1may index an immediate inhibition
of actions whose prior activations could be reflected by larger
parieto-central P1s. Further studies with methods such as the
one used by Rabovsky and McRae (2014) or by Cisek (2006),
should be performed to see whether the amount of inhibition
in the hidden layer(s) of their neuro-computational model could
predict the size of the anterior N1s. In any case, the results
indicate that after the start of the activation of the actions, the
occurrence of an object triggers two stages of inhibition, an early
and systematic one, and a later one. On the other hand, the
present results and the experimental design in which they were
obtained suggest that the LRP itself could index yet another kind
of inhibition, namely, a temporary suppression of the continuous
inhibition that is needed to prevent acting at inappropriate times.
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